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Health insurance and health care in India: a supply-demand perspective 
 
 
Abstract: India’s health care and health financing provision is characterized by too little Government 
spending on health, meager health insurance coverage, declining public health care use contrasted by 
highest levels of private out-of-pocket health spending in the world. To understand the 
interconnectedness of these disturbing outcomes, this paper envisions a theoretical framework of 
health insurance and health care revisits the existing health insurance schemes and assesses the health 
insurance cover in relation to the pattern of health care use using data from myriad official statistics 
and the recent NFHS, 2005-06. Theoretical exploration of the axis of supply-demand determinants 
unfolds that a complex of factors such as sparse health financing options, self-obstructing heavily risk 
protected insurance market and weak consumer demand contribute to the measly level of health 
insurance penetration in India. Health insurance cover is found to be a strong determinant of modern 
health care use. Regional and rural-urban disparities in health insurance and health care are significant. 
Health insurance coverage is positively related while public health care use is negatively related with 
household economic condition and education status. The complex axis of critical supply side 
imperfections and considerable demand side weaknesses necessitate a major health care reform with 
the viable financing and health care options. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the aftermath, of major economic reforms rolled out since 1990, the average socio-
economic conditions of India’s populations have been steadily improving; however, the slow 
progress in raising Government spending on health and improving health care services remain 
generic problems. The emergence of the double burden of infectious as well as the rising non-
communicable diseases has meant an even greater demand for healthcare and increasing 
pressure on the existing health care facilities.   
In India, a number of previous studies on health financing and health care use showed 
that the poor and deprived households were driven to spend a much larger proportion of their 
meager income on health care compared with socioeconomically better off households. For 
the poor and deprived, the burden of treatment, especially inpatient care, was 
disproportionately heavy. Peters et al., (2002) came up with more startling observations: on 
average, the poorest quintile of Indians is 2.6 times more likely than the richest to forego 
medical treatment in the event of illness; more than 40 per cent of individuals who are 
hospitalized in India in a year borrow money or sell assets to cover the cost of health care; and 
hospitalized Indians spend more than half of their total annual expenditure on health care.  
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As India ventures to embrace health system reform and a liberalized health care financing 
system, the development of private health insurance market in the country will not leave the 
poor unaffected (Ferreiro, 2000; Srinivasan, 2001; Government of India, 2005). In the past 
three decades, the development of health care system has seen modest progress but the lack 
of progress in developing an assortment of health financing options remains a 
fundamental weakness in India. Insurance sector reform initiatives aimed to promote market 
driven health insurance can have an adverse effect on the poor in healthcare services 
utilization and access to financing of health care cost and quality (Deepa and Vinish, 2004).  
In the recent past, health sector reform initiative in India– a strategic intervention to 
improve the performance of a health care system – is comprised of a variety of actions such as 
financing, payment reform, regulation, and others, which operate on either or both sides of 
this demand-supply identity (Berman, 1998; Mills, 2000; Rangacharya, 2001.). It follows, 
therefore, that successful intervention - intervention which achieves some intended objectives 
- will be more likely to the extent that the factors determining both consumer and provider 
behavior are well understood and predictable. 
  
In this backdrop, there is considerable void of connecting empirical evidences 
concerning various health care financing options, the measly health insurance coverage, the 
absence of a national health insurance policy and, the lack of market competence to drive 
insurance sector growth vis-à-vis inequitable health care use. The lack of comprehensible 
empirical evidence based research concerning the overall penetration and socioeconomic 
differentials in health insurance cover in relation to health care utilisation pattern continue to 
drain Indian health policy makers into intricacy.  
A multitude of factors may be responsible for the health care outcomes and missed 
opportunities of health care in India. The availability of reliable and sustainable health 
financing options provides the critical interface between life saving and life enhancing 
interventions for people who need them. Set to this context, this paper addresses a 
considerable gap in the growing effort to study health care and health financing in India. We 
explore supply-demand axis of health care and health financing options, assess health 
insurance coverage levels and examine the patterns of health care use and their social 
determinants. We further explore state variations to provide necessary insights about the 
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connecting pathways of health risk burden vis-à-vis coverage in health insurance and the 
skewed public-private health care use in India. 
 
Analytical Framework  
 
A framework of supply-demand determinants of health insurance and health care in India 
Analogous to health care system of many countries in the world, India has a dual health care 
sector comprising: a) public sector health care system where health care service is free or 
subsidized majorly through a large network of government-operated facilities and b) private 
sector health care system where health spending is fully paid out-of-pocket by individuals or 
households. Akin to the health care system, the existing health insurance schemes, apply to 
both public and private health care systems. However, India’s health insurance penetration 
level remains extremely low to make any dent as a major health financing option majorly 
because of lack of progress in the health sector policy reform and persistent imperfections 
arising from the compounding effects of supply-demand in equilibrium and contextual 
factors.  
Previous studies have alluded that the levels of health care and health insurance 
coverage are the outcome of the interactions between the consumer and the provider, in which 
the demand for a service is met by the provision (supply) of that service (Berman, 1998; Ellis 
et al., 2000; Kutzin, 2001; Mahal, 2002; Ahuja, 2004; Wagstaff et al., 2009). While there is a 
rich literature on frameworks measuring health system performance worldwide, literature on 
analytical frameworks devoted to studying health care system, health financing choices and 
demand for health care especially in the Indian context are scarce. In this backdrop, we 
conceptualize a new structural framework to assess supply-demand axis of health insurance 
and health care in India. 
A range of factors related to this: a) access to and opportunity for health care: 
availability, accessibility, affordability, and acceptability and b) use of health care: 
socioeconomic, cultural and contextual factors may either enhance or obstruct health care 
utilization and outcomes. In this paper, based on the above fundamentals, we proposition a 
framework of supply-demand determinants of health insurance, health care system and health 
choice and use in India. In theoretical terms, a given level of health outcome is shaped by a 
complex set of supply–demand related determinants of health care and the functional 
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relationship among those determinants. The theoretical structure of this framework unveils the 
critical pathways through which the supply-demand, intermediary and proximate determinants 
shape a) health insurance coverage and b) health care system and outcomes in India (figure 1). 
The principal dimensions of this framework include supply and demand side determinants 
that mediate the quality and choice of health finance and health care. 
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The structural determinants of health insurance comprise supply, demand and 
intermediary factors leading to the choice of health insurance. The supply determinants of 
health insurance: include type of health insurance schemes, specific products, operational 
measures, accessibility, premium base, choice and quality of providers, eligibility criteria, 
nature of subsidy (risk pooling), and reimbursement policy. The demand determinants of 
insurance: include socioeconomic, demographic and contextual (location, culture) factors. 
The demand determinants represent the ability of individual to choose among the 
competing alternative products and have considerable effects in driving health insurance 
coverage. Both the supply-demand determinants of health insurance are currently major 
limiting factors of health insurance coverage in India. The intermediary determinants of 
health insurance: include variables related to nature of health risk, perceived utility and 
effectiveness and behavioral attributes of individuals. 
 
The structural determinants of health care system, choices and outcomes encompass more 
wide-ranging components of supply-demand determinants and contextual factors shaping 
health care use patterns including health care financial options. The supply determinants of 
health care system and health outcome consist of variables related to health care system: 
structure and organization, strategic policy framework, scope and strength of health 
interventions, operational measures, magnitude and quality of human resources for health, 
effective use of resources, affordability and equitable access, health system responsiveness 
and variables related to quality, cost, choice of health care and health care financing 
options. The demand determinants include health risk conditions, socioeconomic, 
demographic and contextual (location, culture) factors. Overall, the determinants of 
demand represent the capacity of individual to access and assess the competing alternative 
of health care vis-à-vis nature and intensity of health risks that will cumulatively determine 
the need to use health care. The intermediary factors comprise broadly social, political and 
economic environment, risk perception, perceived utility, attitudes and information on 
quality and choices (technology and competing alternative) of health care products.  
Overall, this framework provides a broad-based theoretical and analytical paradigm 
to study health insurance and health care use patterns in India. This framework 
comprehends numerous health system and policy related research questions as an 
important tool of analysis.  
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Materials and Methods 
 
Data Sources 
In this analysis, we use data from multiple sources: a) to understand the levels of private 
out of pocket health expenditure and available health financing options b) to devise a 
comprehensible supply and demand axis of various health insurance schemes c) to explore 
demand determinants of health insurance cover and health care use patterns in India.  
First, data from the following national and international official statistics have been used to 
examine available health care and health financing options, their composition and trends in 
India: a) National commission on Macro-economic and health report, Ministry of Health 
and Family Welfare, Government of India, New Delhi, 2005; b) Information available 
from Health Insurance Data report, 2010-2011 of Insurance Information Bureau, India; c) 
World Bank Report 2002 and World Health Report 2003. 
Second, we use data from the latest round of  National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3) 
conducted in 2005-06 to assess variations and socioeconomic differentials in health 
insurance cover and health care use pattern in Indian states. NFHS-3 had collected 
information on self-reported health insurance coverage representative sample of 109,041 
households nationally.  (for more detailed description of sampling design, see IIPS & ORC 
Macro, and 2007). In the household questionnaire, the respondent was asked ‘whether any 
member of the household is covered with a health scheme and the type of health insurance 
scheme’. In the household questionnaire, the respondent was asked ‘whether any member 
of the household is covered with a health scheme and the type of health insurance scheme’. 
In the NFHS-3, the health insurance schemes were categorized as:   
 Voluntary health insurance schemes or private-for-profit commercial health 
insurance schemes. 
 Employer –based health schemes: 1) mandatory or government run schemes such 
as a) employee state insurance scheme (ESIS) b) central  Government  health  
scheme  (CGHS); 2) private employer-based  health insurance schemes,  and    
 Health insurance schemes offered by non-governmental organizations or 
community based on health insurance.  
 
Methods of Analysis  
First, we present trend analysis of public health spending, private out of pocket 
expenditure, and health insurance cover with comparison of selected countries in the 
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world. Second, we use NFHS data on health insurance cover, and health care use for 
unfolding health care use patterns according to source of health insurance, health care and 
key socioeconomic determinants. Third, we examine the cross-state variations in health 
insurance cover and health care use pattern in India. 
Bivariate and multivariate methods are used in this analysis. Multivariate logit 
regression models are estimated to assess the  effect of socioeconomic factors on health 
insurance coverage and type of health insurance: (i)  public health insurance (ESIS & 
CGHS) (ii) private health insurance schemes which include community health insurance 
programme, other  privately  purchased  commercial  health  insurance  and  other  health  
scheme  or  health insurance  and,  (iii)  employer provided health insurance (the other 
health  insurance  through  employer  and   medical cost reimbursement from the 
employer). Multivariate logit regression models have also been estimated to find the effect 
of health insurance and types of health insurance vis-à-vis socioeconomic demand factors 
on health care utilization patterns. 
 
Results 
 
Supply perspective of health care in India 
India’s public health care system is considered as the main visage of health care for the 
people in vulnerable socioeconomic conditions. However, despite the recent expansion and 
modernization efforts in public health facilities, public health care system continues to 
suffer from poor management, stumpy service quality and weak finances. On the other 
hand, private health care facilities comprising a mixed bag of both superior and 
substandard quality services are more expensive. As a result, in the absence of alternative 
health financial options, households typically have to borrow or sell assets or drain major 
savings to meet hospitalization costs (Gumber, 2001; Gumber and Kulkarni, 2000; Peters 
et al., 2002). The World Bank (2002) estimated that a quarter of all Indians are pushed into 
poverty as a direct result of medical expenses in the incidence of hospitalization. 
 
Government health spending versus private out of pocket expenditure in India 
In India as in the past, the Government spending on health continues to be undermined 
during the period of economic liberalization. Despite the recent modest increases in budget 
allocation to both ongoing and newly launched health care programmes, Government 
health expenditure at just under one percent of GDP is, one of the lowest and consequently 
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levels of private out of pocket (OOP) health expenditures is one of the highest in the world 
(figure 1). Figure 2 displays that the GDP share of India’s expenditure on health has been 
flat with sharp fluctuations during the 1990s. As a connected trend, the share of public 
sector hospitalized care coverage dropped from 60 percent in 1987-88 to just 40 percent in 
2004, representing one thirds decline during the last two decades. During the 1990s, as an 
offshoot of health sector reform policy initiatives, the government health facilities have 
also begun to charge nominal user fees by asking patients to buy expensive drugs and 
diagnostics from private outlets citing non-availability of these in the state setup. Only for 
the most recent period, the share of public health expenditure has shown a slight increase 
(figure 2). However, significant state variations characterize per capita health spending and 
the share of private-out-of-pocket expenditure. Nevertheless, in almost all major states, 
public health spending comprises less than a one fourth of total health spending (figure 3). 
 
Place figure 1-3 about here 
   
As health care services turn more expensive, more and more people have been 
forced to forego treatment. Results from past studies suggested that financial reasons 
account for over a quarter of untreated ailments in rural areas, and over 20 percent of 
untreated ailments in urban areas, a sharp rise from 15 percent and 10 percent respectively.  
Rising healthcare cost is emerging as a foremost reason for impoverishment of people 
(Ferreiro, 2000; Ghosh, 2011). Estimates suggest that 39 million people in India are 
pushed into poverty every year due to expenditure on health and almost 80 percent of 
households OOP expenditure on health spending is on drugs (World Bank, 2002). 
 In this emerging context, studies have suggested that ensuring access to good and 
cheap quality or subsidized drugs can reduce the economic burden of healthcare 
substantially. (World Bank, 2002). Nonetheless, in the macroeconomic context of evolving 
economic and health reform policies, prices of drugs have been rising up steadily with 
little effort from the government to regulate prices, unlike most developed countries where 
government intervene to regulate drug prices through various measures such as bulk 
procurement and supply.  
Unequal access to health care, lack of affordable financing options coupled with 
their poor health status drive deprived socioeconomic groups into more vulnerable health 
circumstances (Ahuja, 2004). Studies have shown that even if the government were to 
provide free healthcare for the poor, accessing healthcare becomes expensive on account 
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of substantial travel and opportunity (time and loss of earnings) cost and hidden cost on 
drugs and health personal, which poor families cannot afford (Naylor et al . ,  1999; 
Economic Research Foundation, 2006).  
 
Supply perspective of health insurance in India 
Health insurance products have been operating in India for almost a century, but trends in 
the growth of the number of policies, members and claims unfold extremely meager 
growth (Insurance Information Bureau, 2011). The overall health insurance penetration 
level is too diminutive to make any significant dent as a competing health financing 
option. Currently, just about 10 percent of the population in  India   has  any  kind  of  
healthcare  cover,  be  it  community  insurance, employers’ expenditure or commercial 
insurance. Existing health insurance cover is largely limited to the small proportion of 
people employed in the organized sector (both public and private), in addition to a 
negligible individual commercial insurance cover. The rest of 90 percent of Indian 
population engaged in agricultural and informal sector has neither heath care cover nor 
social security cover. As a result, health care cost is one of the major reasons for India's 
poor incurring debt (FICCI, 2009). The insurance companies so far have shown very little 
interest or lack of entrepreneurial dexterity in offering an affordable menu of health 
insurance products to people living in a wider spectrum of socioeconomic status including 
the poor (Ranson and Jowett, 2003). 
The poor record of financial protection for health risks represents a paradoxical 
situation of both supply and demand imperfections and lack of progress in providing viable 
menu of health financing options in India (Rao, 2004). The available health insurance 
products in the market in terms of premium base, choice of providers, eligibility criteria, 
nature of subsidy (risk pooling) and reimbursement policy have failed to attract the  vast 
majority of people needing health insurance coverage in the country. Fewer competitively 
priced product choices mean choked up supply on the one side, while low literacy, poor 
economic status and predominately rural residence tend to freeze demand on the other 
side. To comprehend the supply and demand side constrictions, based on the nature of risk 
pooling and ownership, below we have described the three major health insurance markets 
that are currently operating in India: 1) voluntary health insurance schemes or private-for-
profit schemes 2) social health insurance or mandatory health insurance schemes and 3) 
community health Insurance scheme (CHIP).  
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1) Voluntary health insurance schemes (VHIS) or private-for-profit schemes. The VHIS 
schemes are operated by both public and private sector institutions. The public sector 
insurance institutions have been marketing several commercial health insurance products 
comprising both full premium products as well as few subsidized products for the poor. 
The private sector commercial health insurance products are of recent origin. The nature of 
commercial insurance products offered by the private sector entities is based on the 
premise that buyers are willing to pay the premium to an insurance agency that pools 
people with similar risks and insures them for health expenses. The key distinction is that 
the premiums are set at a level, which provides a profit to third party and provider 
institutions. Premiums are based on an assessment of the risk status of the consumer or of 
the group of employees and the level of benefits provided, rather than as a proportion of 
the consumer’s income (Mahal, 2002; Government of India, 2011).  
 
2) Social health insurance schemes (SHIS). These include mandatory health insurance 
schemes or government run health insurance schemes or employer provided health cover: 
SHIS is an earmarked fund set up by government with explicit benefits in return for 
payment. The SHIS is an effective risk-pooling mechanism that allocates services 
according to need and usually compulsory for a certain category of government employees 
where the premiums are determined by income level (and hence ability to pay) rather than 
level of health risk. The social health insurance model ignores expected spending when 
calculating premiums. Instead of high-risk individuals paying higher premiums, 
individuals with higher incomes pay higher premiums. The benefit packages are 
standardized, and contributions are earmarked for spending on health services. Subsides is 
used extensively across risk categories to ensure that high-risk, low-income individuals 
can afford to be part of social health insurance.  
In India, employers in both the public and private sector provide mandatory 
employer-based health insurance or social security schemes through employer-managed 
facilities that include lump-sum payments through salaries, a) reimbursement of 
employee’s health expenditure for outpatient care and hospitalization, b) fixed medical 
allowance, monthly or annual irrespective of actual expenses on health care, and c) 
providing insurance cover under the group health insurance policy (Government of India, 
2002). Also, the employers in central and state government sectors: railways, defense and 
security forces, plantations sector and mining sector provide medical services and benefits 
to its own employees. The population coverage under these schemes is minimal, about 30-
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50 million people, accounting between 3-5 percent of the total population (Mavlankar and 
Bhat, 2000). The two major government-run schemes include the Central Government 
Health Scheme (CGHS) and the Employees State Insurance Scheme (ESIS) and more 
details about these schemes are given in appendix 1. 
 
3) Community-based Health Insurance Programme (CHIP or CBHI). The CBHI includes 
health insurance schemes operated by local bodies such as cooperative schemes, self-help 
group schemes and NGOs. Community-based insurance funds refer to schemes where 
members or service organization prepay a part of the amount each year for specified 
services (Devadasan et al., 2006). The benefits offered are mainly in terms of preventive 
care, through ambulatory and in-patient care. Such schemes tend to be financed through 
patient collection, government grants and donations. Most providers are either NGOs or 
private for-profit organization and the detailed explanation about different providers their 
products and schemes are showed in appendix 1.  
The main strengths of the CBHI schemes are that they have been able to reach out 
to the vulnerable sections to provide some form of health security; increase access to 
health care; protect the households from catastrophic health expenditures and consequent 
impoverishment or indebtedness. However, sustainability is an issue as these initiatives are 
dependent on government subsidy or donor assistance. They provide limited protection in 
view of the very little cross subsidy between the rich and the poor, resulting in small size 
of the revenue pool and coverage, which also limits the potential of obtaining a better 
bargain from the providers. 
 
Demand perspective of health insurance and health care 
A population needing health care may consist of two groups of individuals in terms of a) 
those who can afford to buy health insurance that promises a certain 'minimum' level of 
benefit, and b) those who cannot afford to buy the 'minimum' benefit on their own and 
need some public subsidy. In this setting, private health insurance market is most likely to 
cater to those who can afford to buy insurance. For those who cannot afford market driven 
private health insurance, alternate models of health insurance with need based public 
subsidy are necessary. However, while operationalizing such a model, the conceptual 
distinction gets blurred. Important policy questions that arise here are:  
How best to target and reach the section of the population that need subsidy? 
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What if the government supports voluntary (commercial) health insurance rather than 
expanding the existing social insurance schemes? 
Both the above questions lead to the curious question as to how different types of health 
insurance would operate across different socio-economic spectrum of the population.  
To understand the dynamics of health insurance coverage by background 
characteristics, we estimated logit regression models. Table 1 presents the estimated odds 
ratios of selected socioeconomic predictors on households, which have at least one 
member covered by health insurance. Controlling for other predictors, rural households are 
significantly less likely to have at least one member covered by any health insurance 
(OR=0.70, p<0.001) than urban households (OR=1). The more educated is the head of 
household, greater is the likelihood that at least one member of the household being 
covered with a health insurance scheme. Members of households, where household head 
has 10 or more year education are twice as likely to have health insurance (OR=1.99, 
p<0.001) as compared to those who have no education (OR=1). By sex of the household 
head, household members belonging to female headed households are significantly less 
likely to have health insurance cover (OR=0.76, p<0.001) compared with those belonging 
to male headed households (OR=1). By caste, OBCs and Other castes are less likely to 
have health insurance cover (OR=0.76, p<0.001 and OR=0.95) than Schedule Castes 
(OR=1). This is possible in case of any health insurance as in India, as community health 
insurance programme s are more likely to target socioeconomically deprived Scheduled 
Caste under the health insurance coverage. 
Household members headed by Muslims is significantly less likely to have health 
insurance (OR= 0.46, p<0.001) than households belong to other religion (OR=0.88 and 
OR=1.00). Huge differences are indicated in the likelihood of health insurance coverage 
between lower and upper wealth quintile. Compared with households in the states of north, 
central and northeastern regions, households in the states of east, west and south regions 
are more likely to have at least one member in the household with  health insurance 
(OR=1.15, p<0.01, OR=1.38, p<0.001 and OR=1.33, p<0.001). Overall, the logit estimates 
reveal the residence, education, household wealth and region as influential predictors of 
health insurance coverage among household members.  
Table 1 also presents the estimates of separate logit regression models predicting 
the influence of background characteristics on the type of health insurance coverage. The 
odds of using public health insurance (SHIS) are greater among urban (OR=1) than rural 
households (OR=0.74, p<0.001); vice-versa, the odds of using private health insurance is 
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somewhat higher in rural (OR=1.02, p>0.05) than urban households (OR=1). The 
likelihood of having private health insurance is highly pronounced among the households 
with educated household head (OR=3.16, p<0.001) than the household with no educated 
household head (OR=1). Similarly, the odds of public health insurance coverage are 
greater among the higher educated household heads (OR=1.98, p<0.001) than household 
heads with no education (OR=1). By caste, the likelihood of having public health 
insurance is lower among other backward castes and other castes (OR=0.74, p<0.001 and 
OR=0.71, p<0.001) compared with Schedule Tribe and Schedule Caste (OR=1.26, p<0.05 
and OR=1). In contrast, the likelihood of having private health insurance is twice greater 
among other backward and other castes than Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe. 
Compared to households in states of the northern region, households in the states of 
southern and eastern region are less likely to use public health insurance (OR=0.37, 
p<0.001 and OR=0.71, p<0.001). However, in case of private health insurance, south, west 
and northeast regions indicate twice higher likelihood than north and central regions. 
Overall, public health insurance is more pronounced among socially and economically 
deprived households, while private health insurance is predominant among socio-
economically advanced households. 
 
Place Table 1 about here 
The principal challenge for India is building a sustainable health care system to 
tackle health care needs of those who need it. The chief component and eventual outcome 
of the health care system are the healthcare utilization patterns. To unravel this, we have 
examined the health care utilization patterns by key background characteristics of 
households. Table 2 presents the percentage of households by source of health care facility 
and key background characteristics. Public health care facilities are used much more 
prominently by rural households, not (or less) educated and deprived socioeconomic status 
population categories. On the other hand, private health care facilities are more widely 
used by households in urban areas, with educated heads and better-off socioeconomic 
category.  
Overall, of those who used health care, 65 percent of the households among them 
used private health facility compared with 35 percent of households which used public 
health facility. Overall, majority of the Indian adults either prefer or forced to access 
private doctor or private hospital when they get sick. This paradoxical situation is most 
likely outcome of low government spending in health, the rising double burden of diseases, 
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the limited coverage of social insurance, increased vulnerability, heightening insecurities 
and a sense of deprivation among those too poor to afford private treatment. 
 
Place Table 2 about here 
 
To examine the linkage between health insurance and health care, we have 
estimated the logit regression model to find the effect of health insurance on modern health 
care use and type of health care use. Results in table 3 reveal that when household member 
becomes sick, households with a person covered with any health insurance are much more 
likely to use a modern health facility (OR=2.31, p<0.01)  than those without any health 
insurance (OR=1). Examination of the effect of type of health insurance on the type of 
healthcare use reveals that the effect of private health insurance on use of private 
healthcare is much greater (OR=3.11, p<0.001) than the effect of public health insurance 
on use of public healthcare facility. (OR=2.80, p<0.001). However, the effect of public 
health insurance coverage on use of public healthcare is also significantly high.  
 
Place Table 3 about here 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, we presented refreshing analytical insights concerning the supply-demand 
axis of India’s health financing and health care choices vis-à-vis the levels and patterns of 
health insurance cover and healthcare utilization for India and the states. Overall, based on 
population based national survey data, this analysis revealed the dismal coverage in health 
insurance coverage, declining level of public health care use contrasted by increasing 
reliance on private health care facility. Second, results revealed a mixed pattern of 
considerable regional disparity in health insurance coverage and health care use pattern 
with more pronounced variations by demand related socioeconomic factors.  
By demand related socioeconomic factors, rural-urban disparities are significant. 
Other major social determinants of health insurance coverage and public versus private 
health care use include education, household economic condition, caste and religious 
affiliation. Public health insurance is more pronounced among the socially and 
economically deprived households, while private health insurance is predominant among 
socio-economically advanced households. Similarly, public health care facilities are much 
more widely used by rural households, not (or less) educated and deprived socioeconomic 
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status population categories. In contrast, households in urban areas, with educated head 
and better-off socioeconomic condition, more commonly used the private health facilities.  
Health insurance coverage is positively related; while public health care use is 
negatively related with household economic condition and education status.The positive 
effect of private health insurance on use of private healthcare use was much greater than 
the positive effect of public health insurance on the use of public healthcare facility. 
However, the effect of public health insurance coverage on use of public healthcare was 
also significant. These results amply suggest that health insurance and type of health 
insurance are the key predictors of healthcare and type of healthcare use in India.  
The theoretical exploration of the axis of supply-demand determinants unfolds that 
a complex of factors such as sparse health financing options, self-obstructing heavily risk 
protected insurance market representing supply side vis-à-vis poor socioeconomic 
background resulting in weak consumer demand contributed to the measly level of health 
insurance penetration in India. The state and socioeconomic disparities in health care use 
pattern suggested an emerging symmetric connection with the state and socioeconomic 
disparities in health insurance coverage. First, the states with dominant and major share of 
public health care use indicated relatively lower levels of health insurance coverage and 
vice-versa the states with predominant use of private health care system indicated greater 
coverage of health insurance. Second, rural households, households headed by those with 
no education and belonging to socially backward caste tend to rely on public health 
insurance and health care facilities. By contrast, urban households and socioeconomically 
better of households tend to use private health insurance and health care facilities. 
Beyond these theoretical attributions, in this paper, we have documented extensive 
range of supply-demand weaknesses and cumulative failures that characterize health care 
and health insurance in India. These results have demonstrated that health insurance and 
health care use rates in India are chiefly the outcome of supply-demand axis of health 
insurance and health care and that the complex axis of supply-demand imperfections are 
major barriers to improve health. This suggests that, the health system reform and 
improving health financing options remain daunting tasks warranting strategic policy plan 
to improve health. India’s newly articulated health policy goals ought to be concerned with 
improving health status of population addressing both efficiency and equity dimension as 
well as with the protecting of households from financial catastrophe driven by illness 
(Government of India, 2002).  
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A recent project initiative by India’s planning commission articulates bringing all 
central health financing schemes under one umbrella (Reddy et al., 2011). These policy 
challenges are entrenched in two fundamentals: 1) providing universal health security and 
insurance cover for growing double burden of diseases that demands large amount of 
financial outlays and 2) establishing an acceptable framework to determine a menu of 
health financing options for diverse socioeconomic segments of population with varying 
proximity to health care. The close nexus between type of health insurance and type health 
care use is a clear indication of the potential for developing national health insurance as a 
major programme of health financing with space for both social health insurance (SHIS) as 
well as commercial health insurance schemes (VHIS). 
In recent times, worldwide several countries have been adopting alternative models 
of national health plans for universal health care. India may gain by embracing the best 
blended model for launching a) national health care system agency and, b) national health 
insurance agency. The important challenges in India’s pursuit to usher in universal health 
care and health insurance are: a) strategic operational plan to target and reach all segments 
of the population for universal health care services and b) rolling out a universal health 
protection policy with health insurance cover based on varying paying capacity of India’s 
hugely heterogeneous population.  
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Table 1. Logit regression model estimates: odds ratios of health insurance coverage and type of health 
insurance coverage among those households having health insurance coverage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Background characteristic At least one 
member in a 
household has 
some health 
insurance 
Odds of having a particular type of health insurance among households 
with at least one usual member is covered by a health scheme  
Public insurance1 Private insurance2 
Insurance 
through  
Employer 3 
OR OR SE OR SE OR SE 
Residence 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  Urban@ 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  Rural 0.70***  0.74***         0.05             1.02 0.06 0.95     0.06 
Education of household head 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  No education@ 
 
  
 
 
 
 
<5 years complete 0.98        0.96          0.09   1.12          0.11 1.26     0.13 
  5-10 years complete 1.19**  1.38***  0.07   1.14***          0.09     2.00*** 0.10 
  10+ years complete 1.99*** 1.98***         0.08 3.16***          0.09 4.06***      0.11 
Sex of household head 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  Male@ 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  Female 0.76***         0.81**         0.06       0.94          0.07 1.00 0.08 
Caste/tribe of household head 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  SC@ 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  ST 1.51*** 1.26*  0.10 1.12          0.14 0.92 0.14 
  OBC 0.76*** 0.74***          0.06           1.30*              0.09 0.89 0.09 
  Other                      0.95 0.71***          0.06 2.01***             0.09 1.14 0.08 
Religion of household head 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  Hindu@ 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  Muslim 0.46*** 0.44***          0.09 0.51***          0.09 
 
 
  Christian  0.88 0.61***          0.10 0.62***          0.11 0.45*** 0.12 
  Other 1.00 0.80*            0.08   1.56***          0.90 0.54*** 0.12 
Wealth index 
 
  
 
    1.28* 0.10 
  Lowest@ 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  Second 4.62*** 4.38*** 0.35 7.20***          0.43 2.58** 0.40 
  Middle 14.17*** 14.07***              0.33 13.55***          0.42 7.67*** 0.37 
  Fourth 27.18*** 30.97***         0.32 18.88***          0.41 13.50*** 0.36 
  Highest 73.40*** 72.86***         0.33 49.02***          0.42    30.15*** 0.36 
Number of de jure household 
members 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  0-4@ 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  5-10 0.94     0.95         0.04    1.06          0.05 1.13** 0.05 
  11+ 0.99     0.91         0.13       1.38*          0.14      0.85 0.20 
Region 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  North@ 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  Central 0.76***     0.96             0.06 0.91          0.09  1.05 0.10 
  East 1.15** 0.37***          0.09         1.04          0.10 2.26*** 0.09 
  Northeast 0.61***      1.05          0.06  2.03***             0.07      1.32** 0.09 
  West 1.38***      0.98          0.07 1.43***             0.08 1.68*** 0.09 
  South 1.33*** 0.71***          0.06 2.23***             0.07 2.46*** 0.08 
Omnibus Test of  Model Coefficients 
 
  2882.450***         2176.302***     390*** 
Note: While it was possible to report more than one health insurance scheme, 98 percent of households with coverage reported only 
one type. 
1Employee state insurance scheme (ESIS) and Central government health scheme (CGHS) 
 2Community health insurance programme, other privately purchased commercial health insurance and other health insurance/scheme 
3Other health insurance through employer and medical reimbursement from employer 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05 
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Table 2. Percent distribution of households by type of source of health care that household members 
generally use when they get sick, according to selected background characteristics, India, 2005-06 
 
Background 
characteristic 
Public medical sector Private medical sector  
Other 
source3 Government/ 
municipal 
hospital 
Government 
dispensary/ 
UHC/UHP/ 
UFWC Other1 Total 
Private 
hospital 
Private 
doctor/ 
clinic Other2 Total 
Insurance type 
        
  
Public - - - 40.9 - - - 57.7 1.4 
Private - - - 19.6 - - - 78.3 2.1 
Others - - - 27.8 - - - 69.9 2.3 
Residence 
           Urban 22.6 1.9 5.1 29.6 20.5 45.9 3.1 69.5 0.9 
  Rural 12.1 1.7 22.9 36.8 13.8 36.3 12.4 62.5 0.7 
Education of 
household head 
           No education 13.9 1.8 20.4 36.1 12.8 37.8 12.7 63.2 0.7 
<5 years complete 16.4 1.7 22.3 40.3 13.8 33.6 11.7 59.1 0.6 
  5-10 years complete 17.3 1.9 17 36.3 15.7 39.3 7.9 63 0.7 
  10+ years complete 15.6 1.7 9.6 26.9 22.4 44.9 4.8 72.1 1.1 
Sex of household 
head 
           Male 15.2 1.8 17.4 34.4 16.1 39.7 9.1 64.9 0.7 
  Female 17.2 1.9 15.7 34.7 15.4 37.8 11.1 64.3 1.0 
Caste/tribe of 
household head 
           SC 17.2 1.6 17.8 36.7 12 38.7 12.1 62.8 0.5 
  ST 14.5 2.7 34.7 51.9 8.5 29 8.9 46.4 1.7 
  OBC 14.7 1.3 15.7 31.7 18.9 41.5 7.3 67.7 0.6 
  Other 15.7 2.3 13.5 31.4 16.9 40.5 10.3 67.8 0.8 
Religion of household 
head 
           Hindu 15.2 1.6 17.8 34.5 16.1 40 8.7 64.7 0.8 
  Muslim 15.8 2.3 15.1 33.1 12.5 38.4 15.3 66.3 0.6 
  Christian 26.2 4.1 13.9 44.1 31.2 18.4 4.6 54.2 1.7 
  Other 14 2.8 11.4 28.2 14.7 48.4 7.3 70.4 1.4 
Wealth index 
           Lowest 10.5 1.4 27.5 39.4 7 36 16.8 59.9 0.7 
  Second 13.4 1.5 22.3 37.2 11.2 38 13.1 62.2 0.6 
  Middle 18.3 2.1 18.6 39 15.9 35.4 9.1 60.4 0.6 
  Fourth 20.1 2.2 11.6 33.9 19.5 40.4 5.4 65.3 0.8 
  Highest 15.6 1.9 5.1 22.6 26.6 47.5 2.2 76.4 1 
Household structure 
           Nuclear 16.5 1.9 17.3 35.7 16.2 37.8 9.5 63.5 0.8 
  Non-nuclear 14 1.7 16.8 32.5 15.6 42 9.2 66.8 0.7 
Number of de jure 
household members 
           0-4 17.7 1.9 16.4 36.1 18.5 35.7 8.9 63 0.9 
  5-10 13.5 1.7 18 33.2 13.5 42.8 9.9 66.2 0.6 
  11+ 9.3 1.5 14.2 25 12.4 52 9.9 74.3 0.7 
Region 
           North 19.7 10.3 16.9 48.1 10.9 36.1 4.4 51.4 0.5 
  Central 9.5 0.7 19.5 29.7 6.1 54.8 8.8 69.7 0.6 
  East 11.7 1.1 20.8 33.5 6.1 38.7 20.5 65.3 1.3 
  Northeast 41.3 4.3 30.1 75.8 7.3 11.1 3.9 22.3 1.9 
  West 13.8 1.6 13.6 28.9 13.4 56.0 0.2 69.7 1.4 
  South 26.8 2.5 11.9 41.2 38.5 16.9 2.7 58.1 0.7 
Total 15.5 1.8 17.1 34.4 16 39.5 9.4 64.8 0.8 
Note: Total includes households with missing information on caste/tribe and religion of household head, which are not shown separately. 
UHC = Urban health centre; UHP = Urban health post; UFWC = Urban family welfare centre 
1Includes Community health centre (CHC), rural hospital, Primary health centre (PHC), Sub-centre, Anganwadi, Integrated child 
development services (ICDS) centre, government mobile clinic, and other public medical centre 
2Includes Private paramedic, Vaidya/hakim, homeopath, traditional healer, pharmacy/drugstore, Dai (Traditional birth attendant), and 
other private medical sector 
3Include Nongovernmental organization or trust hospital/clinic, shop, home treatment and any other source 
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Table 3. Logit regression model estimates: Odds ratios for utilization of modern healthcare facilitity by 
health insurance coverage in India, 2005-06 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Background characteristic Visiting any modern 
health facility1 when any 
household member sick 2 
 
Visiting any modern health facility1 
Public2 
 
Private2 
 
Others2 
 OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE 
At least one person in the 
household has some health 
insurance 
        
No         
Yes    2.31** 0.25 NC  NC  NC  
Type of health insurance 
coverage   
      
Public         
No         
Yes        1.49* 0.21 
2.80**
* 
0.06 0.38*** 0.06 0.68* 0.22 
Private         
No         
Yes       2.20*** 0.15 
0.59**
* 
0.06 3.11*** 0.04 0.74 0.44 
Employer         
No         
Yes        0.82 0.21 2.01** 0.08 0.50*** 0.07 1.22 0.23 
CHIP and others         
No         
Yes        1.36 0.44 0.85 0.14    1.20 0.13 1.05 0.39 
Omnibus Test of  Model 
Coefficients 
         590**            2569.102***            3002.210***           670.08** 
Note: 1. Modern Health Facility includes: Govt./Municipal hospital, Govt. dispensary, UHC/UHP/UFWC, CHC/Rural 
Hospital/PHC, Sub-centre, NGO or trust hospital/clinic, Private hospital, Private doctor/clinic. Some other modern health facilities 
are excluded from the analysis because in those facilities use of health insurance is not possible or required.  
2.All four models are controlled for other predictors such as place of residence, sex of the household head, caste  and religion of 
household head, household economics status, educational status of the household head, number of dejure members of households 
and region.  
3.NC-Not Considered  
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05 
  
23 
 
 
Source: World Health Report 2003, Human Development Report 2003 & UNTCAD Report 2002 
 
Figure 1. Percentage share of government health spending in gross domestic product (GDP) of 
selected countries, 2001. 
 
 
Source: Government of India, 2005 
 
Figure 2. Trends in government health spending as percentage share in gross domestic product 
(GDP) in India, 1950-2004. 
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Source: Government of India, 2005 
Note: Other health spending sources includes NGOs and charity hospitals etc. 
 
Figure 3. Per capita health spending per annum and percentage share by source of health 
spending in India and states, 2004-05. 
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Key Features 
 
 
Voluntary health insurance schemes (market products) 
 
Social Health Insurance (SHI) Insurance offered by NGOs / 
community based health 
insurance 
Owners of the Health 
Insurance 
Government  Private companies Government  NGOs/Trust Hospitals/ Micro Finance 
Institution (MFIs) 
Schemes  General Insurance Corporation (GIC) and its 
four subsidiary companies: National Insurance 
Corporation, Assurance Company, Oriental 
Insurance Company and United Insurance 
Company.  
Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) of India.  
Tata IAG Bajaj Alliance, ICICI, Royal 
Sundaram, and Cholamandalam amongst 
others are offering health insurance 
schemes 
 
Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS), 
Employees State Insurance Scheme (ESIS), 
Universal Health Insurance Scheme (UHIS). 
State government sponsored schemes 
 
Community Based Health Insurance 
Schemes (CBHIs) 
 
Provisions The General Insurance Corporation offers 
Personal Accident policy, Jan Arogya policy, 
Raj Rajeshwari policy, Mediclaim policy, 
Overseas Mediclaim policy, Cancer Insurance 
policy, Bhavishya Arogya policy and Dreaded 
Disease policy 
LIC offers Ashadeep Plan II and JeevanAsha 
Plan II.  
Bajaj Alliance offers three health insurance 
schemes namely, Health Guard, Critical 
Illness Policy, and Hospital Cash Daily 
Allowance Policy. 
Provides cash less benefit and medical 
reimbursement of hospitalization expenses 
(pre and post-hospitalization) at various 
hospitals across the India.  
 
ICICI Lombard offers Group Health 
Insurance Policy 
CGHS: 
1. First-level consultation and preventive health care 
service through dispensaries and hospitals under the 
scheme, 2. Consultation at a CGHS dispensary / 
polyclinic or CGHS wing at a recognized hospital. 3. 
Treatment from a specialist through referral, 
emergency treatment in private hospitals and outside 
India. 
 
ESIS: 
Depending on ‘allotment’ as per the ESI Act. 1. 
Outpatient medical care at dispensaries or panel clinics, 
2. Consultation with specialist and supply of special 
medicines and tests in addition to outpatient care; 3. 
Hospitalization, specialists, drugs and special diet. 
4. Cash benefits: Periodical payments to any insured 
person in case of sickness, pregnancy, disablement, or 
death resulting from an employment injury. 
Three type of provisions 1) Dual role 
of providing care and running the 
insurance programme (e.g. ACCORD, 
VHS).  2) NGO is the insurer, 
purchases care from independent 
providers (e.g. Tribhuvandas 
Foundation, DHAN Foundation) 3) 
NGOs plays the intermediate role of 
agent purchasing care from providers 
and insurance companies (TPA, e.g. 
SEWA, Karuna Trust, BAIF). 
The benefits offered are mainly in 
terms of preventive care, though 
ambulatory and in-patient care is also 
covered 
Premium Based on Premiums are calculated based on age and sum 
insured  
Actuarial Risk (Age, Sex, Disease) Premiums based on income 
CGHS: Pay/pension Contribution 
ESIS: All contributions are deposited by the employer. 
 
The premium are usually flat rate 
Choice of Providers 
Eligibility  and 
Coverage 
5- 80 years (children 3-5 years covered with 
their parents) 
Bajaj Alliance and ICICI – 5 to 75 year (not 
allowing entry to those over 55 year age) 
mostly restricted in HMO system.  
 
Royal Sundaram- no age limit apply 
CGHS: 
Employees of the Central Government (excepting 
railways, Armed Forces pensioners and Delhi 
Administration), pensioners, widows of Central 
Government employees, Delhi Police employees, 
Defense employees and dependants residing in 24 
specified 
locations 
 
ESIS:  
Employees (and dependants) working in 
establishments employing ten or more persons (with 
power) or twenty or more persons (without power) and 
Typically targeted at poorer 
populations living in communities. 
Often there is 
a problem with adverse selection 
because of a large number of high-risk 
members, since premiums are not 
based on assessment of individual risk 
status.  
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Appendix 1. Health insurance schemes and their key feature in India 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
earning less than Rs. 6 500 per month. 
 
Selection and Refusals Do occur Do occur. Pre-existing diseases are 
excluded at time f taking policy for the first 
time. 
These are mandatory for central  and  state government 
employees 
Exemptions may be adopted as a 
means of assisting the poor, but this 
will also have adverse effect on the 
ability of the insurance fund to meet 
the cost of benefits. 
Reimbursement Provides for reimbursement of  medical 
expenses 
Based on costs and per cases/procedure 
basis 
CGHS: 
Reimbursement of consultation fee, for up to four 
consultations in a total spell of ten days (on referral).  
Cost of medicines. 
Charges for a maximum of ten injections. 
Reimbursement for 
specified diseases 
 
ESIS: 
Does not allow reimbursement of medical treatment 
outside of allotted facilities. For example, the 
Employees. State Insurance Act 1948 states that 
entitlement to medical benefits does not entitle the 
insured to ‘claim reimbursement for medical treatment. 
Definite benefit package: preventive 
care, in-patient care  
Nature of Subsidy 
(Risk Pooling) 
From Healthy to Sick healthy to sick, high income to low income, 
young to old, small families to big families 
The benefit packages are 
standardized and contributions are earmarked for 
spending on health services 
Premiums are not based on assessment 
of individual risk 
status 
Nature of Competition Not much   Between companies  No competition No competition 
Effect of medical costs  Highly inflationary  Highly inflationary Highly inflationary Highly inflationary 
Nature of Regulation By government  By Insurance Regulatory Development 
Authority (IRDA) 
By government Self-Regulatory  
